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AND THE SIXTH AMENDMENT 
I
n Thomas v. State, 301 Md. 
294, 483 A.2d 6 (1984), the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland 
held that a post-trial psychiatric 
evaluation for purposes of a sentencing 
determination is not violative of the 
sixth amendment's guarantee of 
assistance of counsel solely because the 
defendant's counsel had consented to 
the evaluation without knowledge of the 
fact that it was performed by an expert 
paid by the prosecution. Prior to this 
decision, it appeared that the doctrine 
promulgated in Estelle v. Smith, 451 u.s. 
454 (1981), would have prohibited 
such an evaluation based on sixth 
amendment grounds. 
In Thomas, the defendant, Donald 
Thomas, was found guilty of two counts 
of first degree murder, rape, two first 
degree sexual offenses and robbery in 
the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. 
On petition by the State, the court 
ordered a pre-sentence psychiatric 
examination to evaluate the defendant 
on issues concerning the imposition of 
the death penalty. A psychiatrist from 
the Clifton T. Perkins State Hospital was 
chosen to evaluate the defendant. This 
same psychiatrist had previously 
evaluated the defendant on two 
occasions. Although the defendant's 
counsel consented to the post-trial 
sentence evaluation, he claimed at the 
sentencing hearing that the defendant 
was denied the assistance of counsel 
under the sixth amendment at this 
evaluation because his consent was 
based on the belief that the psychiatrist 
was only a staff member of Clifton T. 
Perkins, as he had been in the previous 
evaluations, and not the prosecution's 
paid expert. The defendant's counsel 
further stated that if he had known of 
this fact he would not have allowed the 




defendant's objection and allowed the 
admission of the psychiatrist's report 
and testimony. The sentencing hearing 
resulted in the imposition of the death 
penalty for one of the counts of murder, 
a life sentence for the other count of 
murder, concurrent terms of life 
imprisonment for the rape and first 
degree sexual offenses, and a twenty year 
consecutive sentence for the armed 
robbery. In the present case, the Court 
of Appeals of Maryland upheld the 
lower court's ruling. 
The court in Thomas began by 
discussing Estelle v. Smith, the governing 
case in this area. In Estelle, the trial judge, 
sua sponte and without consent of the 
defendant's counsel, ordered a pre-trial 
psychiatric examination of the 
defendant to determine his competency 
to stand trial. At the sentencing hearing, 
the psychiatrist testified, based on this 
examination, that the defendant would 
be dangerous in the future, an element 
necessary to impose the death penalty. 
The United States Supreme Court, 
overturning the lower court's ruling, 
concluded that the defendant "was 
denied the assistance of his attorneys in 
making the significant decision of 
whether to submit to the examination 
and to what end the psychiatrist's 
findings could be employed." Estelle, 
451 U.S. at 471. 
The Thomas court, however, reasoned 
that Estelle did not apply. First, 
Maryland does not bear the burden of 
proof in showing future dangerousness 
as did the Texas statute involved in 
Estelle. Second, the defendant was 
informed by the psychiatrist in the first 
pre-trial evaluation that "any 
information which he revealed to the 
psychiatrist would not be held in 
confidence but could be used at a 
subsequent capital sentencing hearing." 
301 Md. at 328, 483 A.2d at 24. Third, 
unlike in Estelle, the defendant's lawyer 
in Thomas "had prior notice of both 
examinations by ... [ the psychiatrist] 
and had the opportunity to confer with 
[ the defendant] before each 
examination." 301 Md. at 328, 483 
A.2d at 24. Fourth, the defendant in 
Thomas, unlike in Estelle, was given 
Miranda-type warnings prior to his initial 
examination. Finally, the defendant's 
counsel was informed prior to the 
evaluation that "the post-trial 
examination by ... [the psychiatrist] W:,lS 
intended to develop material for 
presentation at the sentencing hearing." 
301 Md. at 328, 483 A.2d at 24. The 
court reasoned that, in light of these 
circumstances, it was unimportant that 
the defendant's counsel "was honestly 
mistaken in the belief that ... [the 
psychiatrist] would evaluate the '" 
[defendant] in his capacity as a Perkins 
psychiatrist [because] that fact alone 
would not require reversal under the 
principles of Estelle." 301 Md. at 329, 
483 A.2d at 24. Therefore, the court 
concluded that the defendant's sixth 
amendment right to assistance of 
counsel was not violated in this case. 
Judge Eldridge dissented on the sixth 
amendment issue in Thomas, arguing 
that Estelle did apply because "the 
defendant Thomas was obviously 
denied the assistance of counsel in 
making the decision of whether to 
submit to [the psychiatrist's] 
examination in connection with the 
sentencing proceeding." 301 Md. at350, 
483 A.2d at 35 (Eldridge, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part). Although 
the defendant's counsel did consent to 
this post-trial evaluation, the consent, 
Judge Eldridge reasoned, was "induced 
by the prosecution's deception." 301 
Md. at 350, 483 A.2d at 35 (Eldridge, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). A consent that is "induced by 
misrepresentation is not consent." 301 
Md. at 350,483 A.2dat35 (Eldridge,J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). The misrepresentation in Thomas 
was that the defendant's counsel 
believed that the psychiatrist that 
evaluated the defendant was a neutral 
expert from Clifton T. Perkins and not 
the prosecution's paid expert. 
The dissenter then dissected the 
.majority's reasoning. He stated that the 
burden of proof differences between 
. Thomas and Estelle, as well as the 
psychiatrist's warnings to the defendant 
that any information which he revealed 
could be used at a subsequent capital 
sentencing hearing, were "utterly 
irrelevant to the Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel issue." 301 Md. at 352, 483 
A.2d at 36 (Eldridge, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
Furthermore, Judge Eldridge argued that 
although the defendant's counsel 
consented to the psychiatrist's 
examination, as in Estelle, his consent 
was based on a misrepresentation by the 
prosecution concerning the neutrality of 
the psychiatrist. Therefore, citing Estelle 
as controlling, the dissenter concluded 
that "[b ]ecause of the prosecution's 
misleading action in this case, the 
defendant Thomas was deprived of the 
assistance of counsel in deciding 
whether or not to submit to ... [the 
psychiatrist's] examination in 
connection with the capital sentencing 
hearing." 3D1 Md. at 352,483 A.2d at 
36 (Eldridge, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
The Thomas court appears to have 
restricted the defendant's right to 
assistance of counsel under the sixth 
amendment. By allowing the post-trial 
psychiatric examination of the 
defendant for a determination on the 
imposition of the death penalty without 
the knowledgeable consent of the 
defendant's counsel, it has gutted the 
sixth amendment's protections 
promulgated in Estelle. The court is 
opening the door for the prosecution's 
use of trickery and misrepresentation in 
order to gain a defendant's counsel's 
consent and to deny a defendant the 
assistance of counsel guaranteed him 
under the sixth amendment. Without 
such assistance of counsel, poorly 
educated and fearful defendants will be 
wittingly or unwittingly denied the full 
protection of the law by the 
prosecution. m 
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DOCKWORKER'S REMEDY 
T
he issue of whether a 
dockworker's exclusive remedy 
for an occupational injury is 
under the Longshoremen's and Harbor 
Workers' Compensation Act ("Act" or 
"LHWCA"), 33 U.S.c. §901 et seq., 
where a portion of the injury preceded 
the Act's coverage, was subject to review 
by the Maryland Court of Appeals 
during its September, 1984 term. A 
decision in Stanley v. Western Maryland 
Railway Company, 301 Md. 204 482 
A.2d881 (1984), was reached on October 
24, 1984 and is one which will have 
substantial impact in the area of 
workers' compensation benefits. In 
order to understand the ramifications of 
Stanley, however, one must first have a 
basic understanding of the principles 
underlying the system of workers' 
compensation. 
Benefits for employees injured while 
on the job were first a product of state 
common law and statutes. Although the 
fifty states vary greatly as to the 
substantive legal principles which guide 
particular workers' compensation 
schemes, all systems share the same 
underlying principles: to compensate an 
employee as quickly and efficiently as 
possible for work-related injuries, 
regardless of an employee's 
contributory negligence, and to limit the 
ultimate liability of the employer for any 
such injuries. 
Prior to 1927, there was not a 
uniform scheme of compensation law 
applied by the states to Injuries 
sustained by maritime workers. 
Congress, therefore, saw the need for a 
uniform federal system and the 
LHWCA "was designed to ensure that a 
compensation remedy existed for all 
injuries sustained by employees on 
navigable waters and to avoid 
uncertainty as to the source, state or 
federal, of that remedy." Calbeck v. 
Travelers Insurance Co., 370 U.S. 114, 
124 (1962). 
Apparently, this federal system of 
workers' compensation benefits for 
,maritime employees provided sufficient 
benefits to injured workers for a number 
of years. However, a problem arose in 
that a maritime employee was only 
covered under the Act for certain 
activities (usually only those performed 
on navigable waters) and would not, in a 
maj ori ty of cases, receive any 
compensation benefits under LHWCA 
for injuries sustained on land. Congress 
amended the Act in 1972 "to extend 
coverage to additional workers in an 
attempt to avoid anomalies inherent in a 
system that drew lines at the water's edge 
by allowing compensation under the Act 
only to workers injured on the seaward 
side of a pier." Northeast Marine 
Terminal Co., Inc. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 
249 (1977). 
In the instant case, James Stanley had 
been an employee of the Western 
Maryland Railway Company since 
1942. In approximately 1955 or 1956 
Stanley was assigned to operate a crane 
used to unload cargo from ships. The 
crane was extremely noisy and caused a 
gradual auditory impairment in 
Stanley'S ears. He first became aware of 
his permanent hearing loss in 1977 and, 
in 1979, filed a negligence action against 
his employer under the Federal 
Employers' Liability Act ("FELA"), 45 
U.S.c. §51 et seq. 
The Federal Employers' Liability Act, 
enacted by Congress in 1908, permitted 
a claimant to sue the railroad company, 
his employer, for injuries resulting from 
the company's negligence. Stanley 
contended that the majority of his long 
term exposure occurred prior to 1972, 
at a time when he, as a dockworker, was 
not covered by the LHWCA. Stanley, 
therefore, sought to apportion his 
hearing loss claim between the two 
distinct Acts, FELA and LHWCA. In 
apportioning his disability between the 
two Acts, however, Stanley made a 
